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FEDERAL LEGISLATION STILL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN 






The signing ceremony of California Senate Bill No. 206 (“SB 206”) was not your 
typical administrative event.  On the set of HBO’s The Shop, Governor Gavin Newsom 
was seated alongside professional basketball superstars Lebron James and Diana 
Taurasi as he placed his signature at the bottom of the legislation on September 30, 
2019. 1  The unique scene of the statute’s enactment was a testament to the high hopes 
of its broader implications, the potential effects of which stretched far beyond the 
borders of the state where it was now signed into law. 
SB 206, better known as the Fair Pay to Play Act, represents the most prominent 
attack against the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) prohibition 
against compensation for college athletes. 2  The legislation prohibits all California 
four-year colleges and universities from denying their student-athletes the opportunity 
to earn compensation for their identities.3  The law directly contradicts the NCAA’s 
long-standing rules, setting the stage for an inevitable legal battle to determine the state 
law’s legitimacy. 
However, proponents of the Fair Pay to Play Act are hoping that its passage 
represents something much greater than a single state’s effort to compensate college 
athletes.  The law is a testament to growing national public sentiment calling for 
student-athletes’ ability to receive compensation for the use of their identity.  SB 206 
has inspired lawmakers in several states to draft and introduce their own versions of 
the Fair Pay to Play Act.  The collective actions of these various state legislators have 
illustrated an appetite for student-athlete compensation that spans throughout the 
nation.  Nonetheless, even at the very early stages of these efforts, the disparate 
treatment among states over how college athletes should be compensated foreshadows 
roadblocks to the potential widespread implementation of laws similar to the new 
California legislation.  If such laws are enacted, the practical result would be divergent 
systems of athlete compensation among the states. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; University of North Dakota, 2017.  I would like to 
thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for giving me the opportunity to publish this Note, as well as 
their invaluable assistance and editing throughout the process.  Additionally, I would like to thank Professor 
Ed Edmonds for his willingness to serve as my advisor for this Note. 
1 See The Shop: Uninterrupted, Gavin Newsom signs California's 'Fair Pay to Play Act' with LeBron 
James & Mav Carter, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bfBgjxVgTw. 
2 See CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN., § 67456 (West 2019). 
3 See id. at § 67456(a)(1). 
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As a national organization, the NCAA operates on a broader level than sovereign 
states, and its challenge to state laws—such as SB 206—can hinge upon its ability to 
operate interstate.  In order to achieve the goals behind this wide-spread initiative, the 
interstate nature of collegiate athletics demands a federal solution for the ability of 
players to be compensated for use of their identity. 
It is clear that California’s initial push has succeeded in building national 
momentum against the NCAA’s ban on college athletes being paid for use of their 
name, image, and likeness.  On October 29, 2019, the initiative for change received 
the news that it had longed for: the NCAA’s top governing board voted unanimously 
to begin the process to permit students participating in collegiate athletics the 
opportunity to benefit from the use of their name, image, and likeness.4    While the 
announcement was cause for celebration, cautious optimism quickly swept over those 
who had long advocated for such a change.  This skepticism is rooted in the fact that 
the NCAA fought long and hard before conceding to the swelling calls of the public 
and legislators across the country.  With the amendments to these policies left in the 
hands of the NCAA, the organization retains control of the implementation of player 
compensation in collegiate sports.   
If the objectives of the name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) compensation effort are 
entrusted to the very organization that had long opposed its calls for change, it is clear 
that the NCAA requires a check to such unilateral control of these policies.  This Note 
will argue that Congress should introduce legislation as a strategic safety measure to 
ensure the goals of this successful movement will be sufficiently achieved.  Congress 
should utilize the statutes currently being drafted, introduced, and enacted at the state 
level as models to develop an interstate solution to an issue that requires national 
treatment.  By introducing a federal legislative proposal, Congress can ensure that the 
NCAA employs policies that would safeguard the intentions of the public advocates, 
student-athletes, and state legislators who led the NCAA to concede its opposition and 
prevent the NCAA from eluding the goals behind the resounding calls for change. 
Part I of this Note will give a brief overview of the history behind the NCAA’s 
policies regarding player compensation—both direct and indirect—and the legal issues 
related to amateurism in collegiate sports.  Part II will then address the public 
movement against the NCAA’s amateurism policies, the subsequent state and federal 
legislative proposals on the issue, the NCAA’s response to these various proposals, 
and the current state of the situation.  Part III will analyze the statutory language of the 
various legislative proposals—specifically comparing SB 206 to other state proposals, 
the issue of collective bargaining, and the need for precautionary federal legislation to 







4 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image and 
likeness opportunities, NCAA (October 29, 2019 1:08 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities. 
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I. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE NCAA’S PROHIBITION ON PLAYER COMPENSATION 
 
A.       BACKGROUND 
 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is a voluntary association 
of over 1,117 universities.5  Nearly half a million college athletes participate in sixteen 
sports across three separate divisions (Division I, II, and III).6  The organization was 
initially formed in late-1905 to centralize the safety protocols of college sports.7  In 
that year alone, eighteen student-athletes were killed and 149 were seriously injured 
playing football, prompting a public outcry to either reform the sport or discontinue it 
altogether.8  At the direction of President Theodore Roosevelt, collegiate athletics 
leaders formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States 
(“IAAUS”), which later adopted today’s moniker, the NCAA.9 
While at first it merely served as a discussion group and rule-making body for 
individual sports, the NCAA quickly expanded its role in collegiate athletics.  The 
NCAA began hosting national championships for sports in 1921 and began 
administering women’s athletic programs in 1980.10  Through these developments, the 
“voluntary” membership of its participating universities has arguably become 
compulsory in order for a school to retain its relevance and ability to participate in 
conferences, tournaments, and bowl games.11 
Undoubtedly, the NCAA’s most controversial evolution occurred in 1952 when it 
established enforcement mechanisms for its member institutions.12  The NCAA’s 
enforcement mechanisms allowed for the important preservation of classifying college 
athletes as amateurs.13  Over time, the NCAA has developed the definition of 
 
5 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, What is the NCAA?, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
6 Each of the three divisions has its own rules.  The institutions are divided into the divisions based upon 
the size of their athletic budgets and competitiveness.  See Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The 
NCAA’s Unlawful Restraint on the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (1993).  Division I and 
Division II schools can offer scholarships and financial aid based upon athletic ability.  However, Division III 
schools, the least competitive among the three, have mutually elected to not grant such assistance.  See NCAA, 
2019-20 NCAA DIVISION III, MANUAL Art. 15.01.3 (2019). 
7 See History, ABOUT THE NCAA (Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about%2Bt
he%2Bncaa/who%2Bwe%2Bare/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa%2Bhistory. 
8 WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE 
ATHLETES 38 (1995). 
9 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 1995 THE NCAA 7 (1955). 
10 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4.  
11 See Charles Barrowman III, Can Congress Play Ball?: Congressional Power to Implement and 
Enforce Pay-for-Play among Student-Athletes, 18 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 111 (2015).  The NCAA 
assists its member universities in providing collegiate athletes with various expenses—including housing, 
travel, tutoring, graduate test fees, and more—through the Student Assistance Fund.  In 2013, the NCAA 
distributed more than $73.5 million to its conferences’ member institutions.  See id.  The NCAA’s conference 
and national championships further cemented its monopoly power over collegiate athletics.  By rewarding the 
academic institutions participating in these championships, the NCAA further incentivized institutions to join 
its conference and divisional structure. 
12 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 9, at 13. 
13 See Jeff K. Brown, Compensation for the Student-Athlete: Preservation of Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 147, 148 (1995). 
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“amateur” as a series of prohibited actions for college athletes.14  By maintaining 
amateur status, students participating in college sports are precluded from receiving 
funds, awards, or benefits that are not permissible under NCAA policies, including 
direct compensation for participation or financial aid above the university’s cost of 
attendance.15 
 
B.       LEGAL ISSUES 
 
The NCAA’s preservation of amateurism has not gone legally uncontested.  Its 
case law is guided mostly by dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.16  
In that case, the Court emphasized the importance of college sports being classified as 
amateur in order to distinguish its character and academic tradition from comparable 
professional sports.17  Lower courts have followed this guidance, giving the NCAA 
“ample latitude” to maintain the amateur classification.18  The NCAA quickly 
responded to this judicial interpretation by replacing the use of words such as “players” 
and “athletes” with the term “student-athletes.”19  The NCAA’s emphasis on 
competitors being students buttressed their amateur status and further rejected the 
notion that they could receive any type of employment-like compensation. 
In response to further legal challenges, the NCAA continued to reinforce the 
concept of student-athletes as amateurs.  In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident 
 
14 See NCAA, 2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I, MANUAL Art. 12.1.2 (2019). 
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate 
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (Revised: 4/25/02 effective 8/1/02, 4/23/03 
effective 8/1/03, 
4/29/10 effective 8/1/10) 
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any 
form in that sport; 
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following 
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation; 
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional 
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, 
except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; 
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses 
or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization 
based on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and 
regulations; 
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.12, even 
if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in 
Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; 
(f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional 
draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); or 
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent. 
15 See Brown, supra note 13, at 149. 
16 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
17 Id. at 102. 
18 McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Banks v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
19 See BYERS, supra note 8, at 69-76, 371-72; see also MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE 
CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 445-46 (1998). 
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Commission, the California Court of Appeals held that a college athlete could have a 
contract of employment where a scholarship served as compensation for athletic 
services.20  The NCAA again responded, encouraging its member institutions to use 
language in their athletic grant-in-aid forms that emphasized principles of amateurism 
and the student status of participating athletes.21 
The NCAA’s development of notions of amateurism and student-athlete status 
largely revolved around the prohibition of players receiving employment 
compensation and benefits directly from its member universities.  However, for much 
of the organization’s history, legal precedent had left the NCAA’s prohibition on 
player’s receiving compensation for the use of their name, image, or likeness 
untouched.  Not only did this additional preclusion bar college athletes from a share of 
revenue generated by the NCAA or colleges utilizing student-athletes’ identities, it 
also prevented players from acquiring endorsements and advertising deals from third 
parties. 
In 2009, this restriction finally met legal scrutiny in O’Bannon v. NCAA, a case in 
federal court.  The plaintiffs, comprised of current and former college student-athletes, 
claimed that the NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by preventing players from 
receiving a portion of the revenue the Association and its member schools earn from 
“the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’ names, images, and likeness in video 
games, live game telecasts, and other footage.”22 
The Northern District of California found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that 
the NCAA’s compensation rules were an unlawful restraint on trade and enjoined the 
association from prohibiting its member schools from awarding up to $5,000 per year 
in deferred compensation.23  O’Bannon was the first federal court decision to strike 
down any aspect of the NCAA’s amateurism rules in violation of antitrust laws, and 
certainly the first to mandate by injunction that the Association change its practices.24 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of the district court decision.  While 
affirming that the NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny—
to be analyzed under the “rule of reason”—it rejected the lower court’s finding that 
allowing students to be paid compensation for their NILs is virtually as effective as the 
NCAA’s current amateur-status rule.25  The court reasoned that the NCAA’s 
preservation of amateurism was of the utmost importance, and that the ability for 
 
20 See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). 
21 See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: the 
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (2006). 
22 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
23 See id. at 1008. 
24 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
25 The rule of reason test is the presumptive standard for a Sherman Act claim alleging restraint on trade.  
Under this standard, a defendant’s restraint on competition violates the test if the practice’s harm to 
competition outweighs its procompetitive effects.  Courts typically analyze this balancing standard under a 
burden-shifting framework, requiring the plaintiff to show the restraint produces significant anticompetitive 
effects within a relevant market before turning to the defendant to produce evidence of the restraint’s 
procompetitive effects.  If it reaches this point, the court will only find against the restraint if the plaintiff 
shows that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.  See O’Bannon, 
7 F. Supp. 3d at 985. 
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students to collect cash compensation was in direct contradiction with maintaining this 
status.26 
The Ninth Circuit refused to address whether participants in live TV broadcasts of 
sporting events have enforceable rights of publicity or whether players are injured by 
the NCAA’s current licensing arrangement for archival footage.27  Instead, it 
concluded that the plaintiffs had shown that the NCAA’s rules foreclosing the market 
for their NILs in video games made by third parties resulted in an injury in fact.28 
The O’Bannon effect was to essentially bookend the legal argument for the 
NCAA’s prohibition on player compensation for their NIL.  The case further solidified 
the NCAA’s argument to retain amateur status for collegiate athletics, foreclosing legal 
challenges to its restriction on indirect player compensation.  From a legal standpoint, 
the NCAA’s regulations against any and all player compensation held sound following 
O’Bannon.  Nevertheless, despite this judicial ruling, the NCAA’s policies regarding 
player compensation soon met opposition from an aspect of society wherein final 
judgments are much harder to come by. 
 
II. THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FOR CHANGE AND THE NCAA’S RESPONSE 
 
A.       THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Had the challenges to the NCAA’s restrictions on player compensation been 
restricted to the judicial system, collegiate athletics were all but assured to remain in 
the confines of amateurism.  However, the court of public opinion has increasingly 
come to reflect broad support for some compensation for college athletes.  The shift in 
opinion was also swift and dramatic, leaving the NCAA to fight the battle over player 
compensation on a front that had previously been nonexistent.  
A Gallup poll conducted in 2001 showed that three out of four Americans opposed 
paying college athletes anything beyond the scholarships they were receiving.29  Public 
 
26 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076. 
We cannot agree that a rule permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation 
and a rule forbidding them from paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in 
promoting amateurism and preserving consumer demand.  Both we and the district court agree 
that the NCAA's amateurism rule has procompetitive benefits.  But in finding that paying 
students cash compensation would promote amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the 
district court ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs. 
27 See id. at 1067. 
28 See id.  At the time of O’Bannon, the NCAA had terminated its relationship with Electronic Arts 
(“EA”), the video game maker granted the ability to use college athletes’ NIL by the NCAA.  The NCAA 
asserted that it had no intent to license its intellectual property for use in video games in the future.  However, 
the court placed no weight on that assertion, stating that it was not clearly erroneous for the lower court to 
conclude that the NCAA may well begin working with EA or another video game company in the future. 
29 Mark Gillespie, March Madness in Minneapolis Makes Many Hoops Fans Merry, GALLUP (Mar. 30, 
2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1852/March-Madness-Minneapolis-Makes-Many-Hoops-Fans-
Merry.aspx.  The Gallup poll also showed that only twenty-one percent of Americans would favor paying 
college athletes anything in addition to the scholarships they were receiving.  Moreover, seventy-seven percent 
of respondents stated that they would be opposed to any protests over the issue that would involve a boycott of 
the NCAA basketball tournament, which was beginning at the time of the survey, to draw attention to the issue 
of paying college athletes.  
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perception changed little over the coming years,30 but fringe efforts to combat the 
NCAA’s regulations began to crop up in the corners of a few state legislatures.31  
However, public opinion began to shift as O’Bannon was being litigated.  Polls by 
Seton Hall and Marist College in late 2011 and early 2012 respectively, showed that 
attitudes on the issue revealed a shrinking majority of Americans were still opposed to 
player compensation.32 
However, many of these polls asked respondents if college-athletes should receive 
stipends beyond their school’s cost of attendance.  O’Bannon assisted in drawing a 
distinction between player stipends and players being able to capitalize on their NIL 
through merchandise and advertising contracts.  This distinction proved to be vital in 
the eyes of the public.  A 2014 Reason-Rupe poll showed that sixty-four percent of 
Americans believed that student-athletes should receive money if a college or company 
sells gear containing their likeness or jersey number.33  The 2017 Seton Hall survey 
showed that while sixty percent of Americans still felt providing a scholarship was 
sufficient for college-athletes, only forty-five percent of respondents felt that student-
athletes should not share in TV revenue, or receive a salary for participating in the 
NCAA March Madness tournament.34 
 
30 A 2003 USA Today polling showed that seventy-two percent of Americans were still opposed to 
paying college athletes beyond their school’s cost of attendance.  While this number was down slightly from 
the previous year’s result of seventy-two percent, the figure remained within the margin of error.  See USA 
TODAY, Poll: 72% say athletes should not be paid (Feb. 28, 2003, 3:05 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2003-02-28-notes_x.htm.   
31 See id.  In 2003, Nebraska state senator Ernie Chambers introduced his second legislative attempt for 
University of Nebraska football players to be issued a stipend.  The bill was meant to spark a national 
conversation about paying college athletes, as it would only go into effect if three other states in the Big 12 
Football Conference passed similar legislation.  With public opinion still resoundingly adverse to Chambers’ 
efforts, the movement sputtered with little momentum beyond the borders of Nebraska.  His efforts on the 
issue may finally be coming to a head after all these years.  Senator Chambers, at eighty-two years old and 
now Nebraska’s longest-serving state senator, introduced Nebraska’s version of the Fair Pay to Play Act as 
part of this year’s momentous push by state legislatures across the country for college athlete compensation.  
See Van Jensen, For love or money, THE DAILY NEBRASKAN (FEB. 20, 2003), 
http://www.dailynebraskan.com/for-love-or-money/article_e4338184-3fea-5b24-bea0-5d975ec9faea.html.   
32 See Rob Gloster, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid for Playing Sports, Poll Says, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-22/college-athletes-shouldn-t-
get-salary-for-playing-seton-hall-survey-finds; see also MARIST POLL, 3/29: Majority Thinks Colleges Break 
NCAA Rules . . . Most Say Only Scholarships for Athletes (Mar. 29, 2012), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/329-
majority-thinks-colleges-break-ncaa-rules%E2%80%A6most-say-only-scholarships-for-
athletes/#sthash.41eVjeQd.dpbs.  The 2011 Seton Hall survey showed that two-thirds of people believed that 
student-athletes should be paid a salary to participate in intercollegiate sports.  The survey’s timing is 
noteworthy, as it came on the heels of the NCAA beginning investigations into the University of Miami’s 
possible payment to dozens of athletes and Ohio State football players selling memorabilia for their own 
profit.  Subsequent polling by Marist College continued to show that roughly two-thirds of people remained 
opposed to the idea of compensating student athletes. 
33 Alexis Garcia, Poll: Americans Say College Basketball Players Deserve Share of NCAA's TV Money 
and Merchandise Sales, REASON-RUPE (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:50 AM), https://reason.com/2014/04/03/poll-
americans-support-giving-college-ba/.  The Reason-Rupe poll also showed that half of Americans believed 
that college basketball players should share in NCAA’s $700 million television revenue from the annual 
March Madness tournament.  Id.  
34 Marty Appel, Seton Hall Sports Poll on NCAA Tournament and Student-Athlete Pay (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.shu.edu/business/news/sports-poll-on-ncaa-basketball-players-and-tournament.cfm.  The Seton 
Hall poll also showed a generational divide on the issue, as individuals ages eighteen to forty-four were much 
more likely to believe that students were being exploited than those over the age of forty-five.  Id.  
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Buttressed by O’Bannon, the distinction between a direct payment stipend being 
provided to players and their ability to capitalize on the use of their NIL showed a 
window of opportunity for advocates of change.  Unlike a stipend, NIL rights would 
not reallocate money away from other college students or cost taxpayer dollars.  
Instead, NIL rights would open the door for merchandise and advertising sales of third 
parties, who would be able to voluntarily capitalize on the privilege of using college-
athletes’ identities. 
 
B.       THE MOVEMENT BY STATES 
 
With this distinction drawn, it seemed only to be a matter of time before state 
legislatures took action responding to this new public outlook.  The movement 
eventually found its inception in California, a progressive state with a staggering 
twenty-five institutions participating in Division I Athletics alone and 24,000 college-
athletes across all three NCAA divisions.35  State Senators Nancy Skinner and Steve 
Bradford introduced Senate Bill 206 (“SB-206”), the Fair Pay to Play Act, in February 
2019, which proposed to prohibit any of the state’s universities from denying their 
student-athletes the ability to profit from their NIL.36  The legislation moved through 
committees with little resistance and passed by unanimous support through both 
houses of the state legislature in September 2019.37  The bill was subsequently signed 
into law by Governor Gavin Newsom at the end of that very month.38 
The ultimate ambitions behind California’s Fair Pay to Play Act are much greater 
than a desire to promptly change the compensation status of Californian student-
athletes.  In fact, the statute’s provisions do not become operative until 2023.39  Instead, 
SB-206 was intended to kickstart a national movement toward demanding college-
athletes the right to capitalize on their NIL rights.  This intention is evidenced by 
Governor Newsom’s statements made while signing the bill: 
 
Maverick Carter, Lebron James’s Business Manager: “When you put 
pen to paper right now, what’s this going to change, and what’s this 
going to do?” 
 
 
35 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Division I Schools, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/division-
i-schools  (last visited Mar. 3, 2020); see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA responds to 
California Senate Bill 206, NCAA  (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206. 
36 CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 67456 (West 2019).  See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, SB-206 
Collegiate athletics: student athlete compensation and representation (2019), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206;  see also Michael 
McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, but a Federal Law Is What They Should Fear, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 04, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-football/2019/10/04/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-name-
likeness-image-laws.  Sports Illustrated even gave SB-206 the moniker the “Ed O’Bannon law,” due to its 
close inspiration based on the successful case brought forward by the former NBA player and UCLA 
basketball star. 
37 See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION.  
38 See id. 
39 CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 67456 (West 2019). 
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Governor Newsom: “It’s going to initiate dozens of other states to 
introduce similar legislation, and it’s going to change college sports 
for the better by having now the interest, finally, of the athletes on 
par with the interests of the institutions.”40 
 
The predictions of Governor Newsom and those behind the Fair Pay to Play Act 
were realized nearly instantaneously.  Within a matter of days, lawmakers in other 
states such as Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina had each begun the process of drafting and 
introducing their own versions of SB-206 into their respective state legislatures.41  The 
speed of the movement was staggering, rebuking any notion that this initiative was 
destined to meet the same ends as similar, albeit isolated, efforts for student-athlete 
compensation in previous decades. 
While impressive in its ability to span across dozens of states, the movement to 
enact legislative proposals quickly shifted from expanding across the country to 
creating uniformity among the numerous state proposals.  While each state signified a 
complementary effort to advance the goal of NIL compensation for student-athletes, 
the statutes being introduced in these disparate legislatures were not consistent, 
therefore setting up the NCAA’s traditional legal argument that collegiate sports 
require a national standard. 
 
C. THE NCAA’S RESPONSE 
 
The NCAA was not completely blindsided by the legislative efforts occurring at 
the state levels.  In May 2019, the NCAA had announced that a Federal and State 
Legislation Working Group would examine issues highlighted in recently proposed 
federal and state statutes related to student-athlete NIL rights.42  The working group 
was charged with producing a set of Association-wide principles to provide each 
division guidance for a consistent approach on legislation related to NIL payments.43  
By creating a working group to address these legislative proposals, early supporters 
believed the NCAA was looking to keep the ball in its court, so to speak, by dictating 
how the organization considered modifications to their current policies.44  This concern 
was prompted by the belief that, even at the time of its creation, the working group’s 
 
40 The Shop: Uninterrupted, supra note 1. 
41 See McCann, supra note 36.  
42 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA working group to examine name, image and likeness, NCAA 
(May 14, 2019, 2:40 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-working-group-
examine-name-image-and-likeness. 
43 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEDERAL AND STATE 
LEGISLATION WORKING GROUP, available at 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/exec_boardgov/BOG_FederalStateLegWGFINAL.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
44 See Terry Collins, NCAA’s Ruling on College Athletes Getting Paid Is Still ‘Smoke and Mirrors,’ 
Experts Say, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Oct. 30, 2019, 7:35 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/30/ncaa-decision-
college-athletes-pay/. 
  
312 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 46:2] 
directives seemed at odds with the desires of those initiating legislative proposals to 
address the issue of NIL rights for student-athletes.45 
The diverse effects of each state’s statute also played to the advantage of the 
NCAA.  As a national organization running an interstate operation, the NCAA requires 
uniformity among states for a cohesive system of college athletics.  As a legal 
argument, this plea for comity among states is not novel by the NCAA.  For example, 
in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller, the NCAA was successful in 
seeking injunctive relief to rule a Nevada statute as a per se unconstitutional violation 
of the commerce clause because it required the NCAA to provide additional procedural 
due process protections in enforcement proceedings against the state’s universities.46  
Unquestionably, the NCAA’s legal challenges to subsequent state laws, such as 
California’s Fair Pay to Play, would center around its historically successful argument 
that collegiate athletics is a product of interstate commerce inherently requiring a 
uniform national standard. 
 
D. FEDERAL PROPOSALS 
 
As an alternative to state-led initiatives, there have been signs of efforts to 
introduce legislation at the federal level.  Notably, Congressman Mark Walker (R-NC) 
has introduced House Resolution 1804, known as the “Student-Athlete Equity Act.”47  
The Act, which has bipartisan co-sponsorship, would amend the Internal Revenue 
Code to remove a corporate exemption for student-athletes’ ability to profit off their 
name, image, or likeness.48  In effect, this would force the NCAA to either pay 
significantly more in taxes or allow student-athletes to earn NIL compensation.49  
While more succinct than California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, Congressman Walker’s 
bill illustrates the effectiveness of federal legislation.  Unlike individual state statutes 
 
45 See id.  The NCAA’s press release announcing the working group, while a positive step toward 
achieving the goal of NIL compensation for student-athletes, contained language that seemed to be an attempt 
at mitigating its potential outcomes.  For example, the press release noted that part of the working group’s 
charge was to determine whether players’ NIL payments “would be achievable and enforceable” and “whether 
this would be plausible in keeping with the Association’s mission.”  This language mirrored much of the legal 
arguments that the NCAA had brought forth over the decades in defending its amateur status.  Id. 
46  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).   
Nevada is not the only state that has enacted or could enact legislation that establishes 
procedural rules for NCAA enforcement proceedings.  Florida, Illinois, and Nebraska have also 
adopted due process statutes and similar legislation has been introduced in five other states.  
Those statutes could easily subject the NCAA to conflicting requirements.  For example, 
suppose that state X required proof of an infraction beyond a reasonable doubt, while state Y 
only required clear and convincing evidence, and state Z required infractions to be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Given that the NCAA must have uniform enforcement 
procedures in order to accomplish its fundamental goals, its operation would be disrupted 
because it could not possibly comply with all three statutes.  Nor would it do to say that it need 
only comply with the most stringent burden of persuasion (beyond a reasonable doubt), for a 
state with a less stringent standard might well consider its standard a maximum as well as a 
minimum.  The serious risk of inconsistent obligations wrought by the extraterritorial effect of 
the Statute demonstrates why it constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.  Id.  
47 H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).  
48 See id. 
49 See McCann, supra note 36. 
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attempting to replicate California’s initiative, the Student-Athlete Equity Act amends 
the federal tax code to force the NCAA’s hand on a national level. 
A separate federal approach is being pursued by Congressman Anthony Gonzales 
(R-OH), who was a wide-receiver at Ohio State and went on to play in the National 
Football League.50  Congressman Gonzalez’s intention is to introduce a bill with 
greater “guardrails” than its counterpart from Congressman Walker.51  Congressman 
Gonzalez believes that a national approach is necessary for giving college athletes the 
opportunity to make endorsement money.52  Further, he is unsatisfied with California’s 
delayed implementation of the Fair Pay to Play Act, stating, “I actually think that we 
need to do something quickly, within the next year.  I don't think you have three years 
to figure this out.  I think decisions will start happening immediately.”53  Congressman 
Gonzalez is also confident in his ability to achieve bipartisan support on his proposal.54 
Lastly, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) has expressed his interest in pursuing NIL 
compensation legislation.55  Senator Romney participated in a roundtable discussion 
with other politicians and advocates of the player compensation movement.56  In an 
interview with ESPN, Senator Romney said he was committed to finding a better way 
to compensate college athletes and that he would spend time to gather perspectives on 
how to best move forward.57  In as many words, he stated, “The reality is Congress is 
going to act.  We're coming for you [referring to the NCAA].”58 
Irrespective of the nuances of each federal proposal, it is clear that there is an 
appetite in Congress for a federal approach to student-athlete compensation.  The 
NCAA recognized this fact when establishing the Federal and State Legislation 
Working Group.59  While state legislative efforts, such as the Fair Pay to Play Act, are 
in more mature stages of their enactment process, industry commentators have argued 
that a federal approach is the more appropriate vehicle to deliver NIL rights to college 
athletes.60 
 
E. CALIFORNIA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NCAA’S POLICIES 
 
 
50 See id.  
51 See id.; Dan Murphy, Congressman to propose federal legislation for paying college athletes, ESPN 
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27751454/congressman-propose-federal-
legislation-paying-college-athletes. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. 
55 Dan Murphy, House, Senate members drum up support for compensating college athletes, ESPN (Oct. 
19, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27862466/house-senate-members-drum-support-
compensating-college-athletes. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Brutlag Hosick, supra note 42.  Most obviously, the title of the working group is “NCAA Board of 
Governors Federal and State Legislation Working Group.”  The first few sentences in the Working Group’s 
charge state that “Federal and state legislators have introduced legislation about student-athletes’ ability to 
license and benefit from their name, image and likeness during their period of NCAA eligibility.” 
60 See McCann, supra note 36. 
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Due to the various efforts at different legislative levels, it is likely that the NCAA’s 
capitulation to these disparate movements for student-athlete compensation is not 
monocausal.  However, it would appear that California’s ratification of the Fair Pay to 
Play Act was the straw that broke the camel’s back.61  Prior to the signing of the bill, 
the NCAA sent a letter to Governor Newsom imploring him not to ratify the piece of 
legislation.62  In the letter, which was also posted on their website, the NCAA Board 
of Governors stated they believed the Fair Pay to Play Act was an unconstitutional 
upending of the college sports model.63  Instead, they advocated for a national standard 
to maintain the “essential element of fairness and equal treatment that forms the 
bedrock of college sports.”64  In a USA TODAY interview, Ohio State President and 
Chairman of the NCAA Board of Governors, Michael Drake, stated that SB-206 raised 
constitutional challenges that could be legally challenged if it went into law.65 
Nevertheless, Governor Newsom signed the bill with the knowledge that it could 
serve as the catalyst for a national conversation.66  Although the enforcement of the 
Fair Pay to Play Act was delayed until 2023, the NCAA is now in the position of either 
legally challenging the law or facing an effective expiration date for its prohibition on 
its restrictions against student-athlete NIL compensation.  As previously stated, the 
Fair Pay to Play’s intentions were realized nearly instantaneously across several state 
legislatures.  These disparate pieces of legislation magnified the difficulty of the 
NCAA’s legal challenges to these statutes. 
Just weeks after claiming that legislation such as the Fair Pay to Play Act was 
unconstitutional, the NCAA’s Board of Governors voted unanimously to begin the 
process of enhancing name, image, and likeness opportunities for student-athletes.67  
In the press release announcing the decision, Chairman Drake stated,  
 
Additional flexibility in this area can and must continue to support 
college sports as a part of higher education.  This modernization for 
the future is a natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA 
members have taken in recent years to improve support for student-
 
61 See Steve Almasy, Wayne Sterling, and Angela Barajas, NCAA says athletes may profit from name, 
image and likeness, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/us/ncaa-athletes-
compensation/index.html. In an interview with CNN, Ohio State University athletic director and co-chair of 
the NCAA’s working group stated, “[d]ifferent organizations and associations need interest groups or pressure 
groups to move them in a certain direction, and the California law and other states that bring about laws is 
probably a pressure point for us and caused us to move.  So the bottom line is we're doing what's right and for 
our student-athletes.” 
62 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 35. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. (“It isn’t possible to resolve the challenges of today’s college sports environment in this way—by 
one state taking unilateral action.  With more than 1,100 schools and nearly 500,000 student-athletes across 
the nation, the rules and policies of college sports must be established through the Association’s collaborative 
governance system. A national model of collegiate sport requires mutually agreed upon rules.”). 
65 Chris Bumbaca & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA sends California governor letter calling name, likeness bill 
‘unconstitutional’, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:51 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/09/11/ncaa-sends-letter-calling-california-likeness-bill-
unconstitutional/2284789001/. 
66 See The Shop: Uninterrupted, supra note 1.  
67 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4. 
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athletes, including full cost of attendance and guaranteed 
scholarships.68 
 
The process directs the three NCAA divisions to update their bylaws and policies 
regarding players’ opportunities to benefit from the use of their NILs by January 
2021.69  The Board also listed several principles and guidelines to direct divisions in 
their modernization process, including making clear the distinction between collegiate 
and professional opportunities, reaffirming student-athletes are students and not 
employees of the university, and making clear that compensation for athletics 
performance or participation is impermissible.70  The NCAA’s release stated that the 
board’s action was based upon the recommendations from the Federal and State 
Legislation Working Group.71 
By establishing this process, the NCAA arguably sought to retain control over NIL 
compensation policies.  Instead of litigating the multitude of state statutes being 
brought forward or advocating for Congressional action to create a national standard 
for these laws, the NCAA process puts the movement back on its own terms.  In 
directing their divisions to modernize their rules governing NIL rights for players, the 
NCAA will be the sole overseer for how these bylaws and policies will be formulated 
in the coming years.72   
This is obviously troublesome for many advocates of the movement for college-
athlete NIL compensation.  The very organization that has fought numerous legal 
battles over decades to uphold the policy of amateurism in college sports and reject 
player compensation could now be in the driver’s seat of the process to award college-
athletes these rights.  
Following the NCAA’s announcement, those close to the movement for student-
athlete NIL compensation expressed a guarded response.  Andrew Zimbalist, professor 
at Smith College and an expert on the economics of college sports, stated that the 
NCAA’s action must be viewed as a reaction to the overwhelming force from outside 
and an attempt to “puncture a hole in the balloon of legal and political pressure.”73  
Lawmakers from across the country involved in the efforts to introduce legislation at 
the state level also expressed their wariness in trusting the NCAA with autonomy over 
the process.74   
 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See Andy Kroll, Don’t Cheer the NCAA’s New Player Compensation Announcement Quite Yet, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/ncaa-student-
athlete-compensation-california-football-basketball-905380/. 
73 Id. 
74 See Senators Nancy Skinner & Steven Bradford, Senators Skinner and Bradford Issue Statement on 
NCAA’s Announcement on Name, Image, and Likeness (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20191029-senators-skinner-and-bradford-issue-statement-ncaa%E2%80%99s-
announcement-name-image-and.  The original co-sponsors of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act issued a 
release of conditioned optimism upon the NCAA announcement; see also Mary Green, Lawmakers react to 
NCAA’s initial proposal for athlete likeness compensation, KCRG (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:33 PM), 
https://www.kcrg.com/content/news/ncaa-reaction-564079751.html. Iowa State Representative Joe Mitchell, 
who was planning to propose a version of the Fair Pay to Play Act in their legislature, stated, “If states like 
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Others were even less sanguine about the NCAA’s announcement.  Although the 
NCAA’s press release only established high-level principles and guidelines for the 
process moving forward, some close to the effort to procure NIL compensation found 
this guidance to be lacking compared to the state legislative packages being introduced 
across the country.  Ramogi Huma, the National College Players Association’s 
executive director, stated that the NCAA was engaging in smoke and mirrors with the 
process and laying the groundwork for limiting the benefit to non-cash and direct 
compensation.75 
The lack of details in the announcement, combined with the NCAA’s historical 
stance toward compensation for its players, quickly led many advocates to continue 
pushing for external pressures to ensure that the Association would adhere to the calls 
for change.  Huma urged state and federal lawmakers to continue with efforts to enact 
legislative proposals, saying, “I don’t think this is going to happen voluntarily.”76  
David Carter, executive director of the Marshall Sports Business Institute at the 
University of Southern California, agreed that legal challenges to the NCAA’s 
eventual policies were almost an assurance due to the numerous states that have 
proposed NIL compensation legislation.77 
Lawmakers at the heart of the issue readily offered their support to the idea of 
utilizing state and federal legislation to impact the NCAA’s policy prescriptions 
moving forward.  California Senator Nancy Skinner, who co-authored the Fair Pay to 
Play Act, stated, “[T]he devil will be in the details.  Here in California, we are clear 
that we won’t accept arbitrary limitations and look forward to the NCAA’s final action 
being consistent with the right all other students have to generate income from their 
talent and skills.”78 
To advocates of NIL compensation rights, it seems that the legislative proposals 
being introduced tipped the scales of the debate in their favor, convincing the NCAA 
to begin the process of granting such rights to student-athletes.79  For this reason, 
advocates also see legislation as having a continued role in shaping the policies that 
are born from this process initiated by the NCAA.80  Mr. Huma stated that the NCAA, 
through its initiation of this process, is “attempting to impose conditions it now has no 
 
Iowa, Florida, California had not put pressure on the NCAA to do this, they would not have done any initial 
steps to combat this issue, and so I think it was good that we have had this discussion brought up, and we're 
going to continue to have this discussion on what the details should be on all of this.”  See Brady McCollough, 
News Analysis: NCAA makes move on name, image and likeness use, but there’s a long way to go, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019 11:34 AM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2019-10-29/ncaa-athletes-
nil-college-athletes-profit-name-image-likeness (California Governor Gavin Newsom stated, “California will 
be closely watching as the NCAA’s process moves forward to ensure the rules ultimately adopted are aligned 
with the legislation we passed this year.”). 
75 Collins, supra note 44. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. Considers Loosening Rules for Athletes Seeking Outside Deals, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-athlete-pay.html. 
79 See Kroll, supra note 72. 
80 See Collins, supra note 44; McCann, supra note 36; Kroll, supra note 72. 
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control over” due to the demands of enacted legislation such as the Fair Pay to Play 
Act.81   
Although the NCAA has initiated its own procedure to implement NIL rights for 
student-athletes, advocates have raised legitimate concerns based upon the 
Association’s precedent and its lack of oversight.  For this reason, legislation still holds 
a meaningful purpose in guiding the policies that will eventually regulate the NIL 
compensation rights of college student-athletes.  Particularly, a national standard for 
NIL compensation rights for NCAA athletes is the most desirable outcome.  
Accordingly, lawmakers should look to the legislative proposals already proposed in 
dozens of states to make a uniform standard.  This uniform standard could be 
introduced at the congressional level, giving advocates the ability to shape the NIL 
compensation process at the national lawmaking level.82  With the authority of federal 
legislation, lawmakers would be able to effectively check the NCAA as it proceeds 
through its own process, which could otherwise run the risk of lacking such 
accountability.83 
 
III. A MODEL FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
A.       THE FAIR PAY TO PLAY STATUTE 
 
Though many states have proposed related statutes, California remains the only 
jurisdiction to pass legislation on the matter of NIL compensation for student-
athletes.84  The state’s Fair Pay to Play Act has served as a model for a growing number 
of legislators around the country looking to introduce their own versions into state law.  
For this reason, it is important to look toward SB-206’s statutory language, examining 
the policies that will guide the state’s policy toward NIL rights for student-athletes if 
the law were to go into effect in 2023. 
Foremost, SB-206 proscribes, “[a] postsecondary educational institution shall not 
uphold any rule, requirement, standard, or other limitation that prevents a student of 
that institution participating in intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as 
a result of the use of the student’s name, image, or likeness.”85  The clause creates a 
blanket prohibition on any postsecondary educational institution attempting to prevent 
its student-athletes from compensating from their NIL.  This includes a prohibition 
from such compensation affecting the student’s scholarship eligibility.86 
Moreover, this prohibition extends to any “athletic association, conference, or 
other group or organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics” attempting to 
prevent a student-athlete or school from participating in intercollegiate athletics.87  
These provisions are specifically aimed at the NCAA, which is explicitly mentioned 
 
81 See Collins, supra note 44; McCann, supra note 36; Kroll, supra note 72. 
82 See McCann, supra note 36. 
83 See Collins, supra note 44. 
84 See McCann, supra note 36. 
85 CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN., supra note 2, at § 67456(a)(1). 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at § (a)(2)–(3), (b) (West. 2019). 
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in the text of the statute.88  The legislation also prohibits scholarships earned by 
student-athletes from being treated as NIL compensation.89 
Importantly, SB-206 also lays forth the guidelines for agent representation for 
student-athletes looking to become compensated for their NIL.90  These agents are to 
comply with federal sports agency laws with respect to their relationships with student-
athletes, which are the same laws that guide professional sports agency relationships.91  
However, a student-athlete’s “professional representation” is guided by that of state 
law and licensure.92 
The Fair Pay to Play Act also establishes processes for student-athletes entering 
contracts for NIL compensation.93  A student-athlete may not enter into contracts 
conflicting with the contractual agreements of their college team.94  All contracts 
compensating athletes for their identity shall also be disclosed to an official designated 
by the postsecondary institution.95  Lastly, SB-206 prohibits NIL compensation from 
being procured by prospective student-athletes during the recruiting process.96  The 
Fair Pay to Play Act’s broad language allows student-athletes to receive NIL 
compensation with little constraint.  Save for compliance with existing sports agent 
laws, school policies, and reporting requirements, SB-206 largely creates a sweeping 
allowance for student-athletes to be compensated for their NIL.97 
Upon the NCAA’s announcement that it would start the process for NIL 
opportunities to be granted to its student-athletes, the press release’s language seemed 
to be an attempt to retreat from such permissions.  In contrast to the Fair Pay to Play 
Act, the NCAA’s press release articulated principles and guidelines for the process 
that would appear to open the door for divisions to establish rules that would 
conditionalize college-athletes’ ability to be compensated for their identity. 98  For 
example, the guidelines included: 
 
1. “Assure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete 
students unless a compelling reason exist to differentiate.” 
2. “Make clear the distinction between collegiate and professional 
opportunities.” 
 
88 See id. at § 67456(d). 
89 See id.  
90 See id. at § 67456(c); see 15 U.S.C. § 104 (2004). 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at § 67456(c)(1). 
93 See id. at § 67456(e)(1).  SB-206 also requires that any institution attempting to assert such a conflict 
would be required to disclose to the athlete or the athlete’s legal representation the relevant contractual 
provisions that are in conflict.  See id. at § 67456 (c)(3).  However, a team contract would not be allowed to 
prevent a student-athlete from being compensated for their NIL when the athlete is not engaged in official 
team activities.  See id. at § 67456 (f).  Moreover, postsecondary educational institutions are not allowed to 
prevent student-athletes from being represented by athlete agents or legal representation provided by attorneys 
See id. at § 67456 (c)(1). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at § 67456(e)(2). 
96 Id. at § 67456(b). 
97 See generally id. 
98 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4. 
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3. “Protect the recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to 
select, remain at, or transfer to a specific institution.”99 
 
These statements raised concerns from NIL advocates and led to calls to continue 
legislative procedures to compel the NCAA from creating restrictive measures on NIL 
rights for student-athletes.100 
 
 
B.       STATUTES IN OTHER STATES 
 
 In an attempt to impede such imposed restrictions, California’s Fair Pay to 
Play Act has served as a framework for other states looking to create a sweeping right 
for college-athletes to obtain NIL compensation.  Illinois State Representative 
Emanuel Chris Welch and Florida State Representative Kionne McGhee have 
introduced statutes in their respective legislatures that virtually mirrors the language 
of SB-206.101  However, the consistency among proposals essentially disappears aside 
from those replicating the statutory language of the Fair Pay to Play Act for their state. 
Left to their own design, state legislators have proposed an assortment of statutes 
that directly conflict with one another.  For example, legislation introduced in 
Washington would not limit payment for compensation to student-athletes’ NIL rights, 
but would instead only limit compensation to an amount “commensurate with the 
market value of the services provided. . . .”102  Other instances of inconsistencies 
include: a bill introduced in Colorado that would allow student-athletes to be paid 
directly for competing; a proposed law in New York that would require college athletic 
departments to give a fifteen percent share of annual revenue to student-athletes; a 
South Carolina proposal that would require the state’s largest colleges to pay a $5,000 
annual stipend to athletes of its profitable sports; and a law introduced in Maryland 
that would grant student-athletes the right to unionize and participate in collective 
bargaining.103 
While California’s SB-206 was groundbreaking at the time of its enactment, these 
various state legislative proposals include provisions that would far exceed those 
granted in the Fair Pay to Play Act.  These discrepancies are important because they 
signify the potential lack of uniformity that would attempt to govern a national 
organization if various state legislatures were to pass such disparate provisions.  As 
previously stated, this lack of uniformity could actually play to the advantage of the 
 
99 Id. 
100 See Senators Skinner & Bradford, supra note 74; McCollough, supra note 74; Collins, supra note 44. 
101 See H.B. 3904, 101st General Assembly (Ill. 2019); H.B. 251, 2020 General Assembly (Fla. 2020). 
102 See H.B. 1084, 66th Legislature (Wash. 2019). 
103 See Courtney Annway, States Leading the Charge: A Map of the States Proposing Pay to Play 
Legislation, UB LAW SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT FORUM (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://ublawsportsforum.com/2019/10/02/states-leading-the-charge-a-map-of-the-states-proposing-
compensation-for-student-athletes/.  New York’s legislative proposal also required that an injured athlete 
would retain his compensation opportunities and a sharing obligation for certain revenues.  See McCann, 
supra note 36. 
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NCAA, whose legal arguments for interstate comity has succeeded in cases such as 
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller.104 
The importance of a national standard becomes even more apparent when 
recognizing that the enactment of these various statutes would virtually destroy the 
playing field of the NCAA.  Without a uniform standard, states would be incentivized 
to engage in a race to the bottom, fighting to create the most accommodating laws for 
prospective student-athletes to become attracted to their state’s higher education 
institutions.105  Alternatively, a national standard would allow the NCAA to continue 
with a level playing field across the country and between states.  Not only would this 
simplify and balance the competitive environment of collegiate athletics, it would also 
eliminate the NCAA’s most promising legal challenges to state statutes attempting to 
grant further rights to its student-athletes.106 
As described above, many states’ policy proposals necessitate that college 
athletics departments engage in revenue-sharing with its participants.107  However, this 
scheme would have untoward effects on the collegiate athletics landscape because it 
encumbers upon these departments an expense that was not previously in their static 
budget.  For this reason, it is reasonably foreseeable that many sports programs around 
the country would be eliminated to necessitate the added expense of providing direct 
compensation to student-athletes. 
Moreover, the athletes most likely to receive limited NIL compensation 
opportunities would also likely be the most affected by any such budget constraints—
as athletic departments would be incentivized to eliminate programs with the least 
generated revenue.  Instead, the players in higher revenue programs, who by their 
nature will have greater exposure to NIL compensation opportunities, will receive 
these direct compensation payments required by law as an added bonus to their NIL 
endorsement opportunities.  This complication could also raise the potential for Title 
IX issues, as athletic departments would have to shift scholarship considerations and 
participation opportunities for men and women following the elimination of sports 
program.108  For these reasons, it would be unwise to include direct compensation 
provisions as part of a federal legislative proposal to guide student-athlete 
compensation rights. 
 
C.       COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
Much like the prospect of direct compensation payments, a legislative proposal to 
allow the state’s student-athletes to unionize and engage in collective bargaining may 
 
104 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, at 639 (9th Cir. 1993). 
105 See McCann, supra note 36. 
106 See id. 
107 Colorado, New York, and South Carolina are the most apparent of these examples.  Described at the 
beginning of the subsection, each of these state proposals include a component of direct payments to student-
athletes. 
108 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions#how. 
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prove to be too strenuous of an extension beyond California’s Fair Pay to Play Act.109  
The right for players to unionize is wholly separate from granting NIL compensation.  
Therefore, even if proponents looking to advance student-athletes’ rights wish to 
achieve unionization, it would be unwise to demand that such a right be attached to 
NIL compensation rights.  If it were included in a federal legislative proposal for NIL 
rights, collective bargaining rights may be seen as a dealbreaker for members of 
Congress. 
Furthermore, the issue of collective bargaining for student-athletes has been 
litigated as a separate issue.  Most recently, the issue of unionization for collegiate 
athletes was undertaken in College Athletes Players Association v. Northwestern, 
where Northwestern University football players sought the right to unionize as a 
team.110  The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) voted unanimously to deny 
the football team’s players the right to unionize, citing its concern about whether it 
could even assert jurisdiction for an alternative ruling, which would foreseeably upset 
the NCAA’s competitive balance and have detrimental effects on its existing rules.111 
Due to the NLRB’s hesitation to entertain the unionization of a single team’s 
players, the Board did not address the broader question of whether NCAA student-
athletes have the ability to form a union altogether.112  Additionally, the NLRB declined 
to decide upon whether the football team’s scholarship student-athletes are employees 
under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).113  Further, the 
NLRB asserted that even if it had determined that scholarship student-athletes were 
statutory employees under the NLRA, “it would not effectuate the policies of the Act 
to assert jurisdiction.”114 
Northwestern is the most recent illustration of the unique legal and prudential 
challenges faced by NCAA players’ efforts for collective bargaining and 
unionization.115  These challenges are wholly separate from the progression toward 
NIL compensation benefits.  For these reasons, it would also be unwise for a federal 
legislative proposal to include statutory language granting collective bargaining rights 
to student-athletes of higher education institutions. 
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While California’s Fair Pay to Play Act was extraordinary at the time of its 
enactment, the Act’s passage influenced state legislators across the country to expound 
upon its rights granted to student-athletes.  A flurry of legislative proposals as diverse 
as their jurisdictions have appeared in the few short months since SB-206 was 
signed.116  The proposals have called for terms and rights far beyond those granted by 
the Fair Pay to Play Act, whose passage alone was monumental in granting NIL 
compensation rights to student-athletes.117 
Nevertheless, the diverse statutory grants of direct compensation benefits, 
collective bargaining, and revenue sharing each introduce untold challenges for the 
actualization of greater rights to student-athletes.  The legislative proposals and their 
effects are untested and have ramifications for higher education institutions, athletic 
conferences, and the NCAA.  For these reasons, a federal legislative proposal for NIL 
compensation rights for student-athletes should not include these additional proposals.  
Attempting to piggyback such rights onto a proposal for NIL compensation benefits 
jeopardizes efforts to actualize any enhanced rights altogether. 
Consequently, a federal legislative proposal should mirror that of California’s Fair 
Pay to Play Act.  The Act gives a sweeping allowance to collegiate athletes’ ability to 
be compensated for their NIL compensation rights, but its authority is arguably the 
most conservative approach to laws that have been introduced to grant student-athletes 
such an allowance.118  Aside from granting states’ licensure authority for sports agents 
representing student-athletes, SB-206’s statutory language can be virtually copied 
word-for-word into a federal proposal.119  Moreover, unlike other proposals put 
forward in various states, the simple granting of NIL rights to student-athletes has 
demonstrable support among the general public.120 
It is important to note that such a federal proposal to grant NIL rights may not 
even require passage.  The mere proposal of such a law would initiate congressional 
hearings and increased public awareness that would spotlight the NCAA’s ongoing 
modifications of its NIL compensation policies.  Legislation introduced at the federal 
level would therefore be able to serve the purpose of providing accountability to the 
NCAA’s process of exploring NIL opportunities for collegiate athletes.  While the Fair 
Pay to Play Act’s passage could be seen as being the catalyst for the NCAA’s 
concession to exploring such rights, its oversight ability pales in comparison to a 
hypothetical federal legislative proposal, even prior to the passage of any such 
congressional act. 
There has also been demonstrable congressional support for granting student-
athletes NIL compensation rights.  Representatives Mark Walker and Anthony 
Gonzalez have separately proposed legislation to grant collegiate athletes the right to 
collect revenue based upon their identity.121  Additionally, senatorial interest on the 
issue has been evidenced by Senator Romney, who signaled his readiness to address 
 
116 See Annway, supra note 103. 
117 See id. 
118 See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN., supra note 2. 
119 See Annway, supra note 103. 
120 See Appel, supra note 34. 
121 See H.R. 1804, supra note 47; McCann, supra note 36. 
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the issue with congressional action.122  Collectively, the prospect of congressional 
support for granting NIL compensation rights for student-athletes appears to be quite 
promising. 
If congressional action were to be taken, it would be advantageous to introduce 
such legislation as soon as possible.  The NCAA’s directive for its divisions to update 
their bylaws and policies regarding the opportunity for players to benefit from their 
NIL by January 2021 places a definitive timeline upon the creation of these policies.123  
With the NCAA currently left unchecked, its three divisions are amending their bylaws 
independent of external advocacy, legislative mandate, or effective oversight.  Not 
only would an immediate legislative proposal allow for proper vetting before the 
NCAA’s deadline, it would also give the Association’s divisions adequate time to 




 The signing of California Senate Bill 206 was a turning point in the fight for 
student-athlete compensation.  Since its inception at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the NCAA has fiercely guarded the amateur status of collegiate sports.  
However, a growing public majority has called for student-athletes to have the ability 
to generate revenue for their name, image, and likeness.124  Even in the event that NIL 
compensation rights are granted to student-athletes, the amateur classification of 
collegiate sports retains its non-employee status, bolstered by precedent such as Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and its progeny.125 
The NCAA’s announcement of exploring NIL opportunities inherently contains 
the concession that the amateur status of collegiate athletics can be retained while 
granting its participants NIL compensation rights.126  O’Bannon provided a window of 
opportunity for advocates of player compensation, acknowledging a distinction 
between direct compensation and NIL compensation.127  Long before O’Bannon’s 
decision in 2015, pollsters had already seen momentum in the public opinion’s 
willingness to accept some sort of compensation for student-athletes. 
NIL compensation opportunities quickly became the most likely avenue for 
student-athlete compensation to become a reality.  As opposed to salaries, revenue-
sharing, or direct stipends, NIL contracts could allow third-party organizations to 
voluntarily enter into contracts for the use of a player’s identity.  Free from the 
considerations of taxpayer dollars and athletic department budgets, NIL compensation 
for student-athletes has found majority support in the court of public opinion.128 
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123 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4. 
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Through the Fair Pay to Play Act, the California state legislature took the 
exceptional step of passing legislation to reflect the public’s antagonism toward NCAA 
policies regarding NIL rights for student-athletes.  California’s capacity to effect 
change, represented by its outsized twelve percent proportion of the entire population 
of the United States, motivated legislators around the country to follow suit and 
introduce their own bills to grant student-athletes with similar NIL rights.129 
For its part, the NCAA appeared to be accepting the writing on the wall, 
announcing a working group to examine the legislation that was sweeping the country 
prior to SB-206’s enactment.  However, Governor Newsom’s signing of the law in the 
fall of 2019 created a new reality for the NCAA, establishing a timetable where player 
compensation would be treated differently by statutory mandate.  However, a single 
state’s attempt to effectuate its own policy around collegiate athletics is not novel, and 
precedent such as Miller has shown that the NCAA’s plea for comity among states and 
a national uniform standard is readily heard by courts.130  The NCAA has long utilized 
theories of interstate commerce to strike down individual state’s attempts to alter 
treatment of student-athletes.  However, this argument loses its luster when presented 
against a federal mandate.  Removed from the prospect of disparate impacts upon a 
national organization, congressional action would create the uniformity that has been 
at the heart of the NCAA’s legal argument for decades. 
Placed in a position where the prospect of federal legislation seems likely, the 
NCAA has begun its own process to explore the prospect of instituting bylaws to allow 
for players’ NIL compensation.  Instead of relying upon its longtime tactics of 
litigating student-athlete compensation, the NCAA is attempting to circumvent a 
potential congressional approach to the matter by seeking to recover authority to shape 
its NIL compensation policy.  However, the organization’s history in matters regarding 
player compensation has caused many of the movement’s advocates to call for 
legislative mandates to proceed at all levels. 
The disparate state legislative proposals, albeit impressive in their geographic 
scope, retain the NCAA’s ability to argue for a uniform standard.  Therefore, a federal 
legislative proposal should be brought forward to provide for effective oversight as the 
NCAA proceeds with its own development of NIL policies.  State proposals, although 
inspired by the Fair Pay to Play Act, have had dissimilar statutory language attempting 
to create further rights unconsidered by SB-206.  Disconnected from NIL 
compensation, these proposed rights granted beyond those of SB-206 present their own 
discrete legal and prudential challenges.  For this reason, such statutory language 
should be decidedly separate from a federal legislative proposal for NIL compensation 
rights. 
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act has provided a basic framework for granting NIL 
rights, allowing for such compensation without many constraints.  Effectively, its 
statutory terms are constructed to allow Congress to copy its language into a federal 
proposal.  The mere introduction of such a proposal would signal to the NCAA that it 
is not without supervision in its drafting of NIL compensation policies. 
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Irrespective of whether Congress passes a law mandating NIL compensation rights 
for student-athletes, merely proposing such an enactment still has a place in the effort 
to grant student-athletes such opportunities.  Time is of the essence for any such 
proposal, as the NCAA’s divisions are now within a year’s time of required institution 
of NIL policies.  Congressional action could prove to be the deciding factor in the 
longstanding advocacy for collegiate athletics properly introducing NIL compensation 
opportunities for its participants.  Unquestionably, federal legislation still has a role to 
play in the fight for student-athlete compensation. 
 
 
